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Reform Locally, Act Globally?
Crisis Management Trends in Korea
By James L. Schoff and Choi Hyun-jin
The unique restriction of a one-time, fi ve-year presidential 
term in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has often resulted in 
short-lived changes to the way the nation’s chief executive 
has staffed and managed his national security and crisis 
management apparatus at the highest levels. Previous policy 
offi ces or special assistants are frequently swept aside to 
make room for new campaign friends and advisory com-
mittees, and if the bureaucracy resists certain policies then 
new layers can be added within the Blue House to centralize 
policymaking and work around seconded personnel from 
the Ministry of National Defense (MND) or the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) who might not be fully 
committed to the president’s vision. The recent presidential 
transition in Seoul appears to be a prime example, as the new 
Lee Myung-bak administration quickly made signifi cant 
changes to a variety of national security, crisis management, 
and foreign policy advisory bodies—including wholesale 
revision of the National Security Council (NSC) structure—
that were created or shaped by his predecessor.1
What is perhaps different this time, however, is that Presi-
dent Lee inherits a crisis management apparatus that was 
reformed fundamentally under the previous Roh Moo-hyun 
administration in ways that could transcend political or 
personal preferences. So, while some Blue House positions 
have been eliminated and an anything-but-Roh atmosphere 
pervades the new administration, Lee should also be 
tempted to leave many of these more basic reforms in place 
and build on them. This is because the catalyst for Roh’s 
reforms was not political but instead was a combination 
of factors, including certain failures of the government’s 
past responses to crises, a less intense threat perception of 
North Korea, and a growing awareness and integration of 
the ROK’s crisis management and national security com-
munities with those of other advanced nations. Moreover, 
the Korean military services and Korean nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) are becoming increasingly involved 
in multilateral activities overseas, such as peacekeeping 
operations or disaster relief and humanitarian assistance 
missions, a situation that is prompting the ROK government 
to adopt many international standards.
This is a trend that President Lee seems keen to promote 
as part of his emphasis on “global diplomacy,” and it 
could also be a component of “strengthening [its] strategic 
alliance with the United States.”2 Yet, the roots of crisis 
management reform are largely domestic, and they were 
crafted at a time when ROK leaders were promoting greater 
political and military independence from the United States, 
including the reduction and realignment of U.S. Forces 
Korea (USFK), the reform and modernization of South 
Korea’s own armed forces, and preparation for the transfer 
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2of wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK troops to 
a Korean general. On all of these issues the ROK govern-
ment is being pulled simultaneously in two directions; one 
is still intensely peninsula focused, while the other is more 
regional and global.
Until now, ROK offi cials have usually been careful to 
separate international security and crisis management con-
tributions from their discussions about national reforms, and 
they have not made a similar specifi c connection between 
international missions and the country’s own security (as 
was the case in Japan).3 This might be changing, as South 
Korea’s involvement in multilateral operations will certainly 
infl uence the crisis management reform debate in Seoul, 
and it could lead to a more prominent role in the future 
for Korean diplomats, soldiers, and NGOs when it comes 
to international missions. This paper examines the recent 
history of Korea’s crisis management reforms and explores 
how the new Lee administration might strike a productive 
balance between its global aspirations and local demands.
Crisis Management Reform under Roh
A central theme running through former president Roh’s 
reform effort was a desire to improve the information fl ow 
among ministries and to centralize the decision-making 
process; Figure 1 shows the compartmentalized nature of 
crisis management decision making before Roh’s reforms. 
In March 2003, the Blue House established the NSC Crisis 
Management Center (NSC-CMC) as its fi rst step in a pro-
cess of reform that links what had been disparate systems 
dealing with conventional security crises on the one hand, 
and natural or man-made disasters on the other. “The NSC 
has to enhance its general national crisis management ca-
pabilities by establishing a comprehensive and systematic 
prevention and management system,” said President Roh 
at the opening ceremony of NSC-CMC.4 The NSC-CMC 
comprised a situation room and a planning-coordination 
team. The situation room monitors and analyzes the state 
of affairs around the peninsula and is prepared to alert 
appropriate fi rst responders in case of an emergency. The 
planning-coordination team developed the nation’s crisis 
management capabilities by fostering cooperative networks 
among government agencies.
On 9 September 2004, the NSC-CMC presented its Crisis 
Management Basic Guideline, which detailed the new crisis 
management system’s structure (Figure 2). “We adopted a 
comprehensive security concept in defi ning national crisis, 
rather than confi ning it to conventional security. Under the 
new concept, a national crisis refers to situations that have 
the potential to undermine national sovereignty and core 
elements and values in the nation’s political, economic, 
social, and cultural systems. The crisis management guide 
. . . clearly defi nes responsibilities and roles of related 
government agencies to prevent any vacuum or overlap 
on crisis management,” explained Col. Ryu Hee-in, then 
head of the NSC-CMC.5 The Crisis Management Basic 
Guideline also clarifi ed the highest decision-making body 
for each category by identifying the NSC standing com-
mittee for traditional security, the Central Safety Manage-
ment Committee (CSMC) for disasters and accidents, and 
the Government Policy Coordination Council (GPCC) for 
the nation’s critical infrastructure.6 The NSC-CMC was 
located at the heart of the system for central planning and 
coordination.
In addition to the Basic Guideline, the NSC-CMC also 
published a set of crisis management manuals. The set of 
30-plus manuals comprises about 12 that cover traditional 
security areas, including inter-Korean confl icts; 11 on di-
sasters; and at least 9 on the nation’s critical infrastruc-
ture.7 The manuals specify the responsibilities and roles 
of relevant agencies, step-by-step procedures, and primary 
countermeasures in various cases. When responding to the 
2004 tsunami crisis in Southeast Asia, for example, the 
ROK government followed procedures detailed in two of 
the manuals, Earthquake and Protection of Overseas Ko-
reans. All of these response guidelines have been followed 
by more than 2,800 practical manuals developed since 2005 
that specify more detailed procedures for related ministries 
and local governments.8
Administrative Structure of the New Crisis 
Management System
According to the new Provisions on NSC Operation, passed 
by the National Assembly in March 2003, the NSC was 
expanded to cover all national crises, and under its sec-
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Figure 1: Crisis Management in Korea before 2004
3retariat four new offi ces were created: strategy planning, 
policy coordination, information management, and the 
CMC. Previously, the NSC secretariat had only one offi ce 
with 10 permanent personnel handling crises, but the newly 
expanded NSC secretariat grew quickly to more than 70 
staff members, featuring those dispatched from the MND 
and the Ministry of Government Administration and Home 
Affairs (now called the Ministry of Public Administration 
and Security [previously MOGAHA, now MOPAS]), which 
includes the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) and 
the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). 
The expanding role of the NSC secretariat is important to 
note because the NSC itself meets only rarely (perhaps four 
or fi ve times during a president’s entire term), and it is the 
secretariat that usually does most of the work of planning 
for crises.
The organizational positioning and political infl uence of the 
secretariat was a moving target under Roh, particularly as 
it became tightly linked with the career path of Roh’s close 
adviser, Lee Jong-seok. This is an example of how Roh’s 
reforms became personal, and it is in this area that the new 
president has made sweeping changes. At the start of his 
term in 2003, for example, Roh appointed Lee Jong-seok 
to be vice chief of the NSC secretariat, where he was sup-
posed to assist Roh’s national security adviser, Ra Jong-yil. 
In practice, however, Lee had direct and personal access to 
Roh, often going over the head of Ra and creating a power 
struggle among Roh’s advisers. Moreover, the NSC secre-
tariat slowly became a de facto policymaking body under 
Lee Jong-seok, and it tended to view the ministries more 
as a means of policy implementation instead of a primary 
tool for policy formation.9
Later on, power traveled with Lee Jong-seok when Roh 
made him unifi cation minister (and chairman of the NSC’s 
standing committee) in January 2006. Roh created a new 
Security Policy Offi ce under his chief presidential secretary, 
combining unifi cation, foreign, and security policymak-
ing within the presidential offi ce (Figure 3). The newly 
launched offi ce absorbed the strategy planning, policy 
coordination, and information management functions of the 
NSC, which had stayed just outside the Blue House, further 
consolidating Roh’s and Lee’s control over policy.10 After 
the reorganization, the retrenched NSC focused on crisis 
management planning, CMC operation, and administrative 
support for the standing committee meetings.11
4The new Lee Myung-bak administration has signifi cantly 
revamped these arrangements (Figure 4), with important 
implications that are mentioned below, but there is also a 
strong undercurrent of continuity regarding Roh’s reforms 
that will more likely lead to incremental evolution rather 
than dramatic change. Most noticeably, Lee decided to 
abolish both the standing committee of the NSC and its 
secretariat. The NSC will remain as a constitutional body, 
of course, but a new ministerial-level council, called 
the Foreign and Security Policy Coordination Council, 
replaced the standing committee, and the presidential of-
fi ce is absorbing the functions of its secretariat.12 At the 
same time, the presidential offi ce is planning to transfer 
responsibility for the crisis management situation room, 
previously located in the NSC secretariat (NSC-CMC), to 
the direct control of the Blue House chief of staff.13
Lee is also getting rid of the Security Policy Offi ce, and, 
while certain high-level planning functions will probably 
be taken over by the Foreign and Security Policy Coordi-
nation Council, it appears that some of the policymaking 
power will devolve back to the ministries from where it was 
taken, which should strengthen the infl uence of MOFAT and 
the MND. This is a positive development. Overall these 
changes exemplify Lee’s emphasis on streamlining govern-
ment structures to make them more effi cient, although only 
time will tell whether this proves to be true. The removal 
of layers within the Blue House and the empowerment of 
the ministries are substantive changes, but overall Roh’s 
innovation of strengthening Blue House control over policy 
planning seems likely to remain.
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5The MOFAT minister will chair the new Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy Coordination Council, essentially replacing the 
unifi cation minister in this role and underscoring the global 
diplomacy theme introduced by Lee. Other council members 
include the defense minister, the chief of the National Intel-
ligence Service (NIS), the chief of the Offi ce of the Prime 
Minister, the unifi cation minister, and the senior presidential 
secretary for foreign affairs and national security (Kim 
Byung-kook). There is also a vice (or deputy) minister 
working group under the council that will meet weekly and 
will be chaired by Kim. The Blue House explained that the 
reorganization shows that the Lee Myung-bak administra-
tion views national security as an international issue by 
giving the lead role to the MOFAT.14
Although the rest of Korea’s crisis management apparatus 
will continue to experience minor adjustment, most of 
the restructuring since 2003 and 2004 should survive and 
evolve relatively slowly. Briefl y described, the Central 
Safety Management Committee is the government’s lead 
organization for dealing with natural disasters or accidents 
(Figure 5). Chaired by the prime minister, the CSMC 
not only conducts long-term safety planning, but it also 
provides overall coordination and support for the Cen-
tral Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters 
(CDSCH). NEMA provides large-scale search-and-rescue 
services to CDSCH.15 The CDSCH serves as a chief execu-
tive organization for disaster management, taking charge 
of immediate consequence management and longer-term 
recovery planning. Meanwhile, the head of the competent 
ministry organizes a Central Accident Settlement Headquar-
ters (CASH), which carries out CDSCH’s directives with 
support from NEMA. For example, when a large oil spill 
occurred off Korea’s western coast in December 2007, the 
Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries organized the 
CASH within hours, established communication with the 
Coast Guard and Marine Pollution Response Corporation, 
and requested logistical support from other ministries and 
local agencies.16
Additional near-term changes under Lee will probably in-
clude a lower political profi le for the prime minister and a 
reduction in the prime minister’s staff, as well as possibly 
a reinvigorated role for the National Emergency Planning 
Commission, which handles civilian preparations for war 
on the peninsula or a similar national emergency and which 
languished under Roh. Over time it is also possible that the 
ROK will further consolidate crisis management functions 
across peacetime and wartime scenarios.
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Figure 5: Disaster Management System in Korea since 2004
6If a large-scale disaster occurs overseas, however, it is 
MOFAT that sets up a task force to help coordinate the 
government’s response. The task force’s initial focus is 
to determine the extent of the catastrophe and the fate of 
Korea’s citizens, as well as to establish effective commu-
nication and cooperation between its headquarters and the 
affected nation’s government. At the same time, the MOFAT 
minister, as the CASH director, manages the contributions 
from all of the relevant ministries through interagency co-
ordination meetings. If requested by the affected nation, an 
overseas emergency response group—composed of govern-
ment offi cials, NEMA rescuers, a medical team, and forensic 
doctors—can be dispatched to the disaster area.
In the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, 
the ROK quickly set up a task force within its foreign min-
istry on 26 December to help coordinate the government’s 
response. Instead of assigning the lead role within MOFAT 
to the regional bureau as many governments did, the Inter-
national Economic Affairs Bureau took charge, working 
as part of a broader team effort that included the NSC, 
NEMA, and the prime minister’s offi ce. On 28 December, 
the MOFAT minister held an interagency coordination 
meeting and subsequently dispatched 69 members from an 
overseas emergency response group—16 MOFAT offi cials, 
15 NEMA rescuers, 2 forensic doctors, and 36 medical 
doctors—to Thailand and Sri Lanka by 31 December.17
Many of these initial steps were outlined in the new NSC-
CMC crisis management procedure manuals mentioned 
earlier. “In the past, MOFAT and MOGAHA often bickered 
over the relief responsibility to the overseas disasters. This 
time, the government immediately followed standard manu-
als preparing a cooperative network between MOFAT and 
other ministries,” said one NSC offi cial.18 In addition, on 30 
December President Roh ordered the establishment of an 
interagency working group led by the prime minister. The 
prime minister chaired this impromptu committee, which 
decided on overall policy parameters for the response, with 
input from MOFAT, the NSC, and the MND.19 MOFAT 
worked with the NSC, with support from the MND and 
NEMA, to carry out the working group’s directives. When 
a massive and deadly earthquake struck Pakistan almost 
a year later, the ROK government used a similar process 
to manage the country’s contributions to the international 
relief effort.
Role of the Military
The ROK military and the MND are an important part of 
the government’s crisis management reform program, and 
they have actively developed disaster management capabili-
ties as part of their core duties. “We have decided to take 
up national disaster management support as the military’s 
basic, non-combat operation,” explained an MND offi cial 
in September 2004.20 A month earlier, the ministry set up 
a Disaster Control Support Division to prepare for disaster 
and promote cooperation between Korean forces and USFK 
in the areas of crisis and consequence management, among 
other task areas. This new capacity in the military is intended 
to operate as part of the broader crisis management system 
although to date the focus has been primarily domestic, 
with an emphasis on close cooperation and coordination 
with local CDSCH.21
On the international front, what role the MND and Korean 
military assets should play in a relief or humanitarian opera-
tion has been a diffi cult question for ROK authorities. In 
the immediate aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, for 
example, the United States quickly organized with other 
nations a multilateral military component, dubbed Opera-
tion Unifi ed Assistance (OUA), to work in support of host 
governments and international civilian agencies. Within 
days, OUA grew to unprecedented size and complexity, 
involving the coordination of military assets from more 
than 20 countries in multiple areas of operation. South 
Korea was prepared to contribute, having participated in 
regional workshops and exercises focused on multilateral 
crisis response scenarios, but the speed and scale of OUA 
posed a unique challenge.
The ROK constitution has been interpreted as requiring Na-
tional Assembly approval for the deployment of any ROK 
troops abroad for virtually any purpose. Thus, faced with 
an emergency situation that required a rapid response, the 
ROK government had to choose between quick but limited 
military involvement (not enough to raise objections in the 
National Assembly that the president was overstepping his 
authority) or slower, more substantial military involvement 
that was formally considered by the legislature. Not surpris-
ingly, Seoul chose not to seek National Assembly approval 
and dispatched instead only air and sea transportation ve-
hicles among MND assets, after consulting informally with 
the ruling Uri Party at the National Assembly.
For international missions with a longer lead time, the ROK 
military has been increasingly proactive since it joined the 
United Nations (UN) in 1991, especially in more recent 
years. The government has sent combinations of engineer-
ing, medical, and combat troops to assist in a variety of 
UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) in countries such as 
Somalia, East Timor, Georgia, Liberia, and Nepal. In 2002 
and 2003, Seoul also sent 500 medical and engineering 
soldiers to Afghanistan as part of a mission that lasted until 
2007. ROK troops in northern Iraq peaked at 3,400 in 2004, 
and close to 600 continue to serve there in 2008. Korea’s 
largest UN PKO mission today is in Lebanon. The ROK 
government dispatched 350 troops to Lebanon on 19 July 
72007 to help monitor and secure a cease-fi re. President 
Roh’s cabinet approved the dispatch plan on 28 November 
2006, and the National Assembly passed authorizing leg-
islation on 22 December. Thus, the time lag from cabinet 
approval to deployment was nearly eight months for what 
is ostensibly a one-year mission, demonstrating to many 
that the approval process is too cumbersome.
The MND can react quickly in certain situations, how-
ever, as it did in support of responding to a hostage crisis 
in Afghanistan in July 2007, when 23 Korean volunteers 
were kidnapped by the Taliban. The MND minister opened 
a 24-hour situation room immediately after the crisis oc-
curred, and he dispatched a military liaison team to Ghazni 
city in coordination with MOFAT and the NIS.22 A few 
days later, the MND sent a small military support group 
to Kabul, which established an intelligence network with 
NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 
the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82) to obtain 
real-time information about the movements of hostages and 
the Taliban.23 Meanwhile, USFK provided hostage-related 
intelligence to the MND and helped to establish a visual 
network system that connected ISAF, CJTF-82, and USFK 
with the MND. To support this growing international activ-
ity, the Korean military has developed a military satellite 
communications system during the past decade; it recently 
went into service, which will allow the MND to manage 
overseas operations without relying on other countries’ 
systems.24
More high-tech investment in Korea’s military is expected, 
as the government at the start of 2007 embarked on an am-
bitious reform program known as Defense Reform 2020, 
which was named for the year in which this intense period of 
force and command restructuring is meant to be completed.25 
Reform 2020 will reduce the size of the ROK military 
overall (particularly within the army) but will strengthen 
its capabilities through acquisition of state-of-the-art weap-
ons, communications, surveillance, and mobility systems. 
Jointness among the services and so-called civilianization 
of the defense ministry will also be promoted. The reform 
plan is meant to be fi nanced at a total cost of more than 
620 trillion won (roughly $640 billion) during the next 14 
years. Major increases in sealift or airlift capacities are not 
planned, but there will be some noticeable improvements 
along the lines of the ROK navy’s fi rst landing platform 
multipurpose amphibious ship (named Dokdo, at about 
19,000 tons full-load displacement) commissioned in 2007, 
with two more on the way. At the commissioning ceremony 
for the Dokdo, the head of the ROK navy’s Operations 
Command touted its usefulness for disaster relief, humani-
tarian aid, and peacekeeping operations.26 In another sign 
of potential continuity, President Lee recently stated that 
he would “actively support the military’s efforts to renew 
itself” and advocated military participation in “global peace 
and development activities.”27
Future of Korea’s International Contributions
The overall result of these reforms and investments to date 
is that South Korea is generally better prepared to respond 
to a wider range of both domestic and off-peninsula crises 
beyond those of a purely military or national security nature. 
Moreover, the new Lee administration appears inclined 
to build on these reforms rather than dismantle them, and 
Lee seems keen to orient these reforms in a more global 
direction. There are limits, however, to how quickly and 
effectively Korea can raise its international profi le in the 
crisis management and international security arenas.
In terms of building on work that has already begun, there 
is much left to do to truly operationalize the Overseas 
Emergency Aid Act that was passed in March 2007. This act 
specifi es procedures and regulations for overseas emergency 
relief efforts, including an organization of relief workers, the 
dispatch of military assets, and a standing system for civilian 
coordination with the government and the military. The act 
empowers the minister of MOFAT to organize an overseas 
emergency aid team and to convene a government–NGO 
joint council for overseas emergency aid, and the minister 
can also request the provision of military transport vehicles 
from the MND.28 This latter option needs to be further de-
fi ned, and this process might be linked to the establishment 
of a specially designated PKO force.
Since the tsunami, the ROK government and military have 
begun contemplating the creation of an emergency response 
unit for overseas consequence management missions. The 
results of this internal discussion were presented in a report 
to the presidential transition team on 6 January 2008 by the 
MND, which outlined a plan to establish a 1,000-strong 
standby force to be ready at all times for PKO and disaster 
relief missions, if requested by a host government or the 
UN.29 The Lee government is interested in proceeding, but 
offi cials need to consider a number of important issues, such 
as whether National Assembly approval will be required for 
any and all dispatches of this unit; how the unit will interact 
with other nations’ PKO teams; and how the ROK unit is 
commanded, trained, and integrated with the other ROK 
defense reforms under way.
In conjunction with this, three PKO bills are currently pend-
ing (and competing) at the National Assembly. One calls for 
advance legislative approval for PKO dispatch plans for the 
following year, while the others accept ex post approval. 
Two of the bills restrict missions to UN PKO, while the other 
one allows overseas disaster relief operations.30 If the latter 
bill is approved, the channels for communication and coor-
8dination in multilateral situations will need to be improved 
in the ROK crisis management system, as demonstrated by 
the fact that manuals for responding to overseas disasters 
describe only bilateral coordination procedures with the 
affected nation.31 In addition, the MND plans to establish 
a state-run training center for PKO by the end of 2009, al-
though the bill to create the PKO center has been pending at 
the National Assembly since 2006. Together, these represent 
an opportunity for the Lee administration to quickly realize 
signifi cant reforms on the international front that developed 
only slowly under Roh. This will be especially true if Lee’s 
political party can win a larger share of seats in the National 
Assembly in the April 2008 elections.
Combined with improvements to Korea’s domestic decision 
making and information sharing processes, any movement 
on the proposals noted above will surely enhance South 
Korea’s ability to contribute to the management of overseas 
crises. Going forward, policymakers will need to pay more 
attention to the specifi c roles and responsibilities of govern-
ment, military, and civilian workers as well as to the detailed 
procedures for mutual cooperation and information sharing 
in various cases. Some of this is being accomplished in 
collaboration with USFK and government agencies in both 
countries; issues addressed include sensor detection and 
medical surveillance to deal with severe chemical, biologi-
cal, or pandemic disease incidents. Avian fl u in particular 
has been a catalyst for wider regional cooperation in an 
interagency context because it involves health ministries, 
foreign ministries, international organizations, NGOs, and 
even local governments.
Beyond joint studies and workshops, an effective way to 
facilitate an even quicker, coordinated reaction is to plan 
ahead of time for different scenarios with partners and then 
to practice together as much as possible. The speed and 
effi ciency of the international response to the tsunami, for 
example, were greatly enhanced by annual military exer-
cises known as Cobra Gold, which take place in Thailand 
and involve forces from the host country, the United States, 
Indonesia, Singapore, and Japan. Although Korea sends ob-
servers to the Cobra Gold exercises and participates in other 
regional initiatives, Korea has an opportunity to take greater 
advantage of these ongoing programs in order to enhance 
multilateral crisis response planning and training.
Korea has begun to do this at an annual PKO exercise in 
Mongolia called Khaan Quest. Khaan Quest began in 2003 
as a U.S.-Mongolia interoperability exercise focused on 
PKO and stabilization operations, and it was designed to 
help prepare Mongolian soldiers for their contributions to 
the international coalitions serving in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The exercise went multilateral in 2006, and a year later the 
fi eld exercise portion involved more than 1,000 troops from 
nine different countries, including Korea.
But for all of these signs that Seoul is on the verge of 
becoming an international activist for global “peace and 
prosperity” (the term Roh applied to his North-South 
policy), there are a number of limiting factors that should 
cause us to anticipate a more modest transformation. First of 
all, North Korea has not gone away, and the ROK military 
is in the midst of a complicated and expensive process of 
modernizing itself in the form of Reform 2020 and taking 
over OPCON from U.S. forces. Reform 2020 is predicated 
on steady increases in defense spending at a rate of 9.9 
percent per annum between 2006 and 2010, and smaller 
rates thereafter. But the actual increases for 2007 and 2008 
were only 7.2 percent and 9.0 percent, respectively, which 
means that later increases will have to be even higher than 
planned (which is unlikely) in order to keep pace.32 This 
reality will dampen Seoul’s enthusiasm for becoming overly 
active militarily overseas, and it will keep the ROK military 
focused on the peninsula.
In addition, President Lee owes his election largely to 
pledges to improve Korea’s economy, and this priority looks 
tougher every day, given recent negative global economic 
developments. The direction of North-South relations is 
also notoriously unpredictable, which could distract the 
ROK government, and there is still a sizable constituency 
in Korea for investing aid monies in the North, rather than 
overseas as part of a more global diplomatic approach, as 
Lee advocates. These and similar fi nancial, political, and 
security concerns will restrain Seoul’s appetite for a grow-
ing international role in disaster relief, PKO, and crisis 
management operations.
Still, we should recognize the strides that Korea has made 
in reforming its national security and crisis management 
apparatus, and we should take time to understand how 
the Lee administration is building on earlier reforms. The 
Lee government’s more global outlook and professional 
treatment of these issues is a welcome development for 
U.S.-ROK relations, the region, and the world. Measured 
expectations and patience are prudent, but there appears to 
be a unique opportunity to press forward with ROK leaders 
and offi cials to enhance Korea’s standing and contributions 
to global peace and stability.
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